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Venture Backed IPO’s in India:
Issues of Certification and Underpricing

A. Vinay Kumar*
Indian Institute of Management

Introduction
Indian venture capital industry is now considered as one of the predominant players
among South Asian countries. As India started emerging as a country which is considered as a
hi-tech and global outsourcing center, Indian venture capital industry started looking up with
new investment opportunities. New funds have opened their shop here in India and are
continuing to bring in more and more funds.
Indian research on initial public offerings is sparse. Previous studies have highlighted the
presence of significant underpricing in IPOs. Studies also review the aftermarket performance of
these IPOs but the aspect of venture backed IPOs and certification was never studied before. The
present study has attempted to study whether venture backed IPOs are different in terms of
underpricing and does it indicate certification of quality by venture capitalists.
The study finds that underpricing is significantly less in venture backed IPOs and through
econometric models it finds that the presence of venture capitalists on the board does signal
quality of the IPO and therefore certify the IPO. Good lead managers generally understand the
kind of value addition venture capitalists try to make to a firm they fund and they therefore
attempt to market the IPO at a better price thus reducing underpricing.
One of the essential and logical purposes of venture capital business is to exit, ideally
through an initial public offering (IPO). The reason for their preference for an IPO is not difficult
to understand, and could be attributed to the higher valuation per share that a venture capitalist
would get if they offer their stock to public when compared to valuation in any other form of
exit.
Indian venture capital industry was dormant for a very long time. In spite of its existence
for over two decades, its importance has been realized only recently. Favorable guidelines were
instituted by the government to encourage venture capital finance in India in 1996 and several
amendments were made in the policy to encourage venture capital investments. But after two
decades of its existence one pertinent question one would ask is what the performance of this
industry is. When we talk about performance one has to evaluate the nature of venture backed
IPOs.
*
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Venture backed initial public offerings (IPOs) are relatively less in number when
compared to many non-venture backed IPOs, but many have gone public and many are in the
process of going public. Investors‟ community has questions and they would like to know, how
have these ventures fared in the capital markets in the past? Were these Initial Public Offerings
(IPOs) risky? Were these IPOs any different when compared to a similar asset class? Also many
Indian venture capitalists are really unsure about their exit strategy. The choice of an IPO,
instead of a trade sale is often difficult to make because even they are unsure about the response
they would receive from investors‟ community.
The present study therefore attempts to answer whether venture backed IPOs are different
from non venture backed IPOs. If they are indeed different from ordinary IPOs in terms of their
returns and perform better than them, such performance can be attributed to venture capitalists
participation in the venture‟s development. Thus the presence of venture capitalists on the board
would signal quality and would act as a form of certification from venture capitalists. The
present study would also attempt to understand what are the determinants of venture capitalists
certification are through econometric models.
The remaining sections are: Section Two reviews literature of studies conducted in other
countries and in India on the subject. Section Three introduces the status of Indian venture
capital industry. Section Four presents the methodology of the study and introduces the
econometric models of the present study. Section Five discusses the results of the study and
Section Six concludes the study with cues for further research.
I.

Review of Literature
Loughran, Ritter and Rydquist (1994) have studied the phenomenon of underpricing in
25 countries and have reported that underpricing is inevitable in IPOs. The extent of
underpricing in different countries may vary, but almost every researcher would agree that
underpricing is prevalent in all IPOs. The reason offered by the theorists of IPO underpricing is
asymmetric information. Baron (1982) attributes the same to adverse selection and moral hazard
problem and suggests that investment bankers who act as the agents have superior knowledge
about the IPOs market and underpricing happens because of conflict of interest between issuer
and the investment banker. Rock (1986) focuses on this aspect of informational asymmetry
between informed and uninformed investors and relates the pricing of an IPO to „winner curse‟
faced by the uninformed investors. Allen and Faulhaber (1989) explain the same by attributing
the phenomenon of underpricing to signaling hypothesis, which happens when the high quality
firms‟ initial owners retain more share with them and offer a portion of the holding at a lower
price than their intrinsic value, which can be inferred by uninformed investor as a signal of
quality. As the information contained in the signal is discounted by the investors the after-market
share price would significantly increase and the initial owners can recoup the losses of
underpricing by disposing of their stock at a higher price in the market.
Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, Vetsuypens (1990) use a sample of 433 venture backed IPOs
and 1123 non venture backed IPOs to find if there exist any difference in average initial returns.
They find no significant difference between a venture backed IPO and non venture backed IPO.
However in a multivariate econometric model controlled for size of the issue, standard deviation
of initial return and underwriters dummy variable, they argue that underpricing reduces if
venture capitalists have a larger equity participation before the IPO and if venture capitalists
serve longer on the boards of the funded companies. Megginson and Weiss (1991) used a
matched sample of 320 venture backed and 320 non-venture backed in terms of issue size and
industry over a four year period and reported that the underpricing is significantly less for
venture backed IPOs and finds the evidence for certification. Brav and Gompers (1997) have
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used a variety of techniques to quantify the abnormal returns and have found that venture backed
IPOs out perform the non-venture backed IPOs.
Research pertaining to underpricing of IPOs is sparse in India. Ajay Shah (1995) used as
many as seven regression equations to study the reasons for underpricing of IPOs in India. For
the purpose he chose a large sample of 2056 IPOs during the period from Jan 1991 to May 1995.
The study reports that large issues are less underpriced and small issues have larger underpricing.
One of the major determinants of underpricing as reported by the study is listing delay, which is
characteristic to Indian IPOs. Madoosudhanan et. al (1997) studied 1922 IPOs from 1992 to 1995
and reported the extent of underpricing. More importantly they studied the aftermarket
performance of many of these IPOs from the day of listing to three years. The study reports
positive return even after three years and places an argument for the need for relaxing Securities
Exchange Board of India‟s(SEBI) norms. However the aspect of underpricing and the role of
venture capitalists on the board of a company going public has never been scrutinized in India.
The paper attempts to examine and compare the level of underpricing in venture backed IPOs
and non-venture backed IPOs.
II.

The Venture Capital Experience in India
The origin of venture capital in India can be traced back to the setting up of a Technology
Development Fund in the year 1987 through the levy of a cess on all technology imports. The
fund was managed by Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI). The idea to have venture
capital fund administered by IDBI was a failure. Out of Rs. 418.65 cr collected over a period
from 1986 to 1996, the amount credited to IDBI venture capital division‟s account was only Rs.
57.84 cr over the same period. IDBI never really paid much attention to these funds because the
size of the fund was so meager that it could not be kept track of.
The Government's decision to encourage knowledge-entrepreneurship through the
promotion of venture capital industry was in the right spirit. But the policy guidelines framed in
November 1988 proved to be highly restrictive. It only pictured the Government's caution in
allowing private enterprises to flourish. The venture capital guidelines actually proved to be
counter productive and never offered any encouragement to the local venture capitalists. For
instance, there were no tax incentives for either the venture capitalists or investors in the venture
capital guidelines.
In 1996, the Finance Minister in his Budget speech repealed the November 1988
guidelines and announced tax concession to the industry. Fresh guidelines were issued by the
SEBI in 1996 and for the first time the guidelines recognized the importance of hands off
regulation. Some of the recent amendments include the lifting of 40% ceiling on equity
contribution to a single venture. Now a venture capital fund can have 100% of company equity
to finance the project. In order to give a fillip to venture activity in India several committees
were set up to identify lacunae in the policy guidelines. The recent Chandershekar‟s Committee
(2000)which presented its report in the year 2000 came up with several changes to facilitate flow
of foreign capital into India which the government has agreed to in principal.
The formation of Indian Venture Capital Association (IVCA) is yet another development,
which coordinates the activities of all the players. Over the last few years, it has become a strong
pressure group and has called for several changes in the policy of the Government.
II.a. Venture Capital Commitments
Indian venture capital industry is now considered as one of the predominant players
among South Asian countries. The industry underwent a major shift in focus. It is not one of
those countries which offers lower-cost production alternatives, but is a hi-tech and global
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outsourcing center. New funds have opened their shop here in India and are continuing to bring
in more and more funds.
The size of total funds committed to this industry was Rs.4918.9 millions in 1993. This
figure rose up by 27 times to Rs.1, 35,053 million in 2000. Similarly the value of investment
portfolio was Rs.3178.81 million in 1993 and it rose by about 23 times to Rs.72, 380 million in
2000. As can be seen in Table 1 significant growth was registered during the period from 1998 to
2000 where the growth in investment portfolio is more than 100% on a year on year basis. One
can also notice that the industry committed a large pool of resources but only about 50% of it
was invested in various ventures leaving a significant portion uninvested. The reason is venture
capitalists are unable to find good quality deal flow (Vinay Kumar A, et al. 2002).
Venture capitalists grew more cautious in investing in new opportunities in 2001(IVCA
Year Book, 2001). This trend is not unusual because a similar pattern can be observed in the
international venture capital markets. Year 2001 witnessed a fall of 21.8 p.c. in disbursements
when compared to previous year $907.58 millions investment in 101 new ventures.
II.b. Stage Wise Investment
The concern that the industry is changing gears and is shifting its focus to later stage
investment opportunities cannot be ignored. A highly contrasting picture emerges if we compare
the figures of 1993 with those of 2000. In 1993 the cumulative funds committed to seed stage
was as much as the cumulative funds invested in later stage (See Table 2). The figures in the year
2000 speak a different language altogether. Now the major share of funds stays invested in later
stage (about 51%) and second comes the start up stage, which attracted 40% of the total fund
invested. Seed stage appears to have few takers as the years rolled by. The reasons are once
again lack of good quality deal flow in the early stage ventures and shift in risk preference of
venture capitalists. Some venture capitalists are parking their funds in safer bets.
Only a few venture capital companies seemed to be active in the year 2001. All stages of
investment reported a decline when compared to 2000 with one exception i.e. early stage
ventures indicating renewed interest back into this stage.
III.

Data and Methodology
The data of venture backed IPOs was collected from various venture capitalists in India.
Since there is no database in India on venture backed IPOs, venture capitalists were requested to
disclose the names of the companies which went public from the funds they operated. Many
venture capitalists shared their list of IPOs with me. The number of IPOs that formed part of the
present study is 40 from among the 47 names we had. The study used various sources to collect
information about these companies. Firstly I have used Center for Monitoring Indian Economy
(CMIE) dataset of all the IPOs from 1989 to 2002. The dataset does not contain information
about some companies on our list. Also, it was found to be an insufficient dataset in terms of
information regarding the underwriters and other details required for the study. So I turned to
getting the information from popular magazines in India namely Dalal Street and Capital
Markets to gain requisite information about the companies on our list. Again we faced difficulty
in getting information regarding some companies on our list even from these magazines. The
time period of the study is June1992 to March 2001.
In order to compare with the venture backed asset class we have chosen non-venture
IPOs from the above mentioned sources in the similar manner for the same period. We had 62
IPOs in this sample. A total of 102 companies formed the sample for the study.
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III.a. Regression Models
In order to understand whether venture capitalists make any difference on the board, I
have studied the determinants of underpricing in India. Initial day returns could be influenced by
factors such as the prevailing market condition, the venture capitalist acting as one of the board
members, the ability of the firm to employ a good merchant banker, the technology of the firm,
the size of the issue, the time the company would take to list on the stock exchange and the
number of times the issues gets subscribed.. In India listing delay is phenomenal, it was as high
as 1095 days in the present sample and as low as 45 days. The reason is previously the norms
instituted were in sufficient with regard to listing delay. Even thought the present SEBI norms
say that after the closing date of the issue the stock should be listed within 16 days (T+16, where
T is the closing date) the listing delay still seems to be a sour issue in Indian primary markets.
The following equation was employed for the purpose.
Rit = β0+ β1MARKET+ β2VENT+ β3RANK+ β4LSIZE+ β5LDELAY+ β6TIMES + β7TECH(1)

Where
Rit is the initial day raw return1
β0 is the intercept
β1 through β7 are model coefficients
MARKET = the return on the market index for the similar period as the initial day
returns used as proxy for market condition
VENT is coded as 1 for companies with venture capitalist on the board and 0
other wise
RANK is coded as 1 for lead managers of issue, if they are among the top five
during that period and 0 otherwise
LSIZE is log of Issue size
LDELAY is Log of number of days delay for listing
TIMES is number of times the issue is subscribed
TECH is coded as 1 for companies, if the sampled company is a technology
companies and 0 otherwise
The a priori relationship of each of the above independent variables on the dependent
variable can be stated as positive if the direction of movement is in one direction i.e. if they have
direct relationship and negative they are inversely related. The variables which have a positive
1

Initial day raw return are calculated as

trading and Pi0 is offer price

P

Rit   it  1 *100 , Where Pit is closing price on the first day of
 Pi 0 
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relationship with underpricing are MARKET, LDELAY, TECH and TIMES. The variable which
are supposed to be negatively related are VENT, RANK, PREMIUM and LSIZE. The logic is
simple prevailing market conditions directly effect underpricing, if the market returns are high
then the underpricing will also be high because as investor expectations from one point in time to
the other increase the expectations of the returns on the stock that went public will also increase.
Delay in listing on the stock exchange may cause uncertainty in the price discovery process. The
investors thus would like to see the stock listed at a higher price then the offer price
compensating for the time loss. The technology of the firm going public is new then it again may
cause uncertainty in the minds of investors, and may effect the price discovery process causing
underpricing. The number of times an issue gets subscribed could also send a signal to the
market that the offer price was too less and that is the reason why many investors have
subscribed to the issue and listing price may go up because investors who take this cue that the
issue is priced too less and could be taken advantage of may buy the issue on the first day of
trading thus causing underpricing.
Good quality issues are not underpriced as compared to the bad quality counterparts. So
underpricing is inversely related to venture backed IPOs, because they are good in quality.
Venture capitalists generally bring value addition to the venture they fund and hence these firms
are generally of high quality thus should be negatively related to underpricing. Again the public
offer of firms of good quality are managed by reputed lead managers, because if the manage bad
quality issues their reputation will be at stake. Since good quality IPOs price discovery is more
efficient than the bad quality ones underpricing is less and lead managers help in the process of
this price discovery. Thus reputed lead managers role is negatively related to underpricing.
Premium issues are regulated by profitability and track record norms by SEBI hence firms which
fulfill these norms may be of good quality and the offer document indicates the justification for
the premium, thus premium issues may be less underpriced as compared to par issues suggesting
an inverse relationship. Issue size may also play a role in pricing of the issue, the logic is bigger
firms can afford offer bigger chunk of their shares to public. Since bigger firms demonstrate
their existences in terms of past profitability and future plans, their issues may not be
underpriced as much, thus suggesting an inverse relationship with underpricing.
A similar regression was also employed to test the effect of the above mentioned
independent variables on the annualized initial returns2.
The second set of regression equations were employed to understand whether venture
backed company do better after listing. For the purpose all the above mentioned independent
variables were used to study their influence on the returns after listing. Returns were calculated
from the listing day to one month period after listing, two-month period and three month periods.
The following equation was used for the purposes.
MRit = β0+ β1MARKET+ β2VENT+ β3RANK+ β4LSIZE+ β5LDELAY+ β6TIMES + β7TECH(2)

Where MRit is Monthly after market returns, the suffix t denotes number of months, in the
present case one month, two month and three months.
Finally to understand the determinants of certification by venture capitalist as logistic
regression was used of the form as depicted in equation number 3. Since variable VENT is a
2

For the purpose of annualized return R it was multiplied by a factor of (365/ DELAY). Where DELAY is number
of days elapsed before listing the issue on the stock exchange.
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dichotomous variable logistic regression is appropriate for the purpose. The logistic regression
estimates the odds ratio favoring VENT =1, that is odds of a company being venture backed. The
logarithmic form of the odds ratio will give us the linear regression equation of the form shown
in equation 3.
The possible independent variables that have a bearing on certification of venture capitalist are
the reputation of lead managers and good lead manager not being able to take up the task of
managing the issue if they are not convinced about the quality of the issue. RANK is used as a
proxy for reputation of the lead manager. After market returns should essentially differentiate
venture backed firms from non venture backed firms, to proxy this aspect three months returns
were used in the model. The technology of the firm should differentiate venture backed firm
from a non venture backed firm, to proxy this aspect TECH variable was used and finally in
order to study the influence of size on venture backed companies LSIZE was used in the model.
Logit (VENT) = β0+ β1RANK+ β2MR1+ β3 MR2+ β4 MR3+ β5 TECH+ β6 LSIZE
(3)

Where MR1, MR2, and MR3 are the return after one month, two month and three months of listing
respectively from the first day of closing.
IV.
Results
The overall underpricing in Indian IPOs is about 120% which is consistent with earlier
studies in India (See Table 3, Panel C). The returns in the months to follow seem to fall
drastically, which is not reported in the studies previously conducted. Panel D of the table
presents the underpricing of non-premium and premium issues. Premium issues are issues
offered at a higher price than their face value, which is usually Rs.10 in India. In 1992 SEBI
introduced free pricing of the issues in India. The underpricing for non-premium issues is very
high at 203% whereas premium issues underpricing is at 49%. In terms of the monthly returns
there is not much of any difference.
From Table 3, Panel A, it is evident that the mean underpricing of venture backed IPOs is
63.14%. Whereas the non-venture backed IPOs have an underpricing of as much as 157.64%
(from Panel B), which is more than twice when compared to venture backed IPOs. The average
returns of venture backed IPOs after listing for three months also seem to be better than the nonventure backed IPOs. In month one after listing if the returns are 16% from venture backed IPOs,
it is -16% for non-venture backed IPOs. The third month seems to be lower for both venture
backed IPOs and non venture backed IPOs, but even here venture backed IPOs score a point by
registering a marginally higher returns when compared to non-venture backed IPOs. The
standard deviations for both asset classes, if we compare, again show a similar picture. The
standard deviation of initial day returns for venture backed IPOs is 107.77 % where as it is
580.61% for non venture backed IPOs, even though the standard deviation is high for venture
backed IPOs representing the general nature of risk involved in this type of asset class, it is much
better than the standard deviation of non venture backed IPOs. A similar trend is visible in the
standard deviation of returns for a three month period. This strongly suggests that venture capital
IPOs are different from their non venture backed counter parts. This also indicates that venture
backed IPOs are superior to non-venture backed IPOs. In order to understand whether it is due to
certification hypothesis, as cited earlier, I have used regression model discussed in the previous
section.
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IV.a. Regression on Initial day returns
Table 4 presents the results of the regression as discussed in equation one from Section 4
above. The dependent variable Rit stands for initial day returns and ARit stands for annualized
initial day returns. The variables that have a significant„t‟ score for a model regressed on R it are
MARKET, LSIZE, TECH and LDELAY. Both VENT and RANK are insignificant. The results
of the analysis match the apriori sign mentioned in parentheses in Table 4 excepting one variable
that is VENT. The initial day underpricing is explained by a linear relationship with prevailing
market conditions, the delay an issue would take to list on the stock exchange and the risk of the
technology involved. The initial day underpricing has an inverse relationship with the size of the
issue. The variables that contribute to underpricing as is evident from the analysis are market
conditions, delay in listing and the technology of the issue. The larger the delay the larger is the
underpricing likewise if the venture involves an unknown technology underpricing increases.
Market conditions have significant bearing on the underpricing, if market returns are high initial
day returns will also be higher and vice versa. The size of the issue has an inverse relationship
indicating an increase in issues size reduces underpricing consistent with earlier studies. Initial
day underpricing is not explained by both VENT and RANK. This can be interpreted as, even
though for VENT the apriori sign does not match, by having venture capitalists on board the
IPOs underpricing does not increase. Likewise a good lead manager also does not contribute to
the underpricing of the issue.
When a similar regression is performed on the annualized initial day return the results
sufficiently match with earlier regression on raw returns. The significant variable that explains
the initial day underpricing in annualized term are, TIMES, LSIZE, MARKET. TECH is also at
90% confidence interval. The reason why LDELAY does not come up as a significant variable is
annualized returns are adjusted for delay. Again VENT, PREMIUM and RANK are insignificant
suggesting that the venture capitalist on the board does not contribute to underpricing of the
issue.
From the above analysis it can perhaps be inferred that as venture capitalists backed firms
are less underpriced, venture backed IPOs are certified by venture capitalists as superior firms
when compared to non-venture backed firms.
IV.b. Regression Monthly returns after listing
Table 5 presents the results of equation number two, where the dependent variable of the
model is the returns after one month, two months and three months from the first day of closing.
The purpose of this regression is to see whether venture capital backed companies perform well
after the listing. The regression on return of month two and three did not yield significant results,
so the table only presents the results of return of month one after listing. The two variables that
came out as significant are VENT and LDELAY, all other variables are insignificant. The apriori
signs also match the results. The first month returns of venture backed IPOs are significantly
high. That means all venture backed IPOs register positive first month returns. These returns
however will be lowered if the delay in listing increases. The reason why other variables came
out as insignificant is they are already discounted for in the initial day closing price.
From the above analysis it is evident that venture capital backed IPOs are high quality
IPOs. To have a venture capitalist on the board could signal quality of the IPO. And that is the
reason why the first month returns are high, after that the returns fall probably because of the
increased supply of the stock from venture capitalists and other institutional investors in the
market.
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IV.c. Logistic Regression
If venture backed IPOs are superior to non-venture backed IPOs and venture capitalists
certify the quality then it is pertinent to understand what distinguishes venture backed IPOs from
non-venture backed IPOs and what are the determinants of certification. For this purpose a
logistic regression was employed. Since variable VENT is coded as a dichotomous variable
employing OLS would seriously compromise on the assumptions of BLUE3, since it is a non
linear variable. Therefore a form of non linear regression which involve maximum likelihood
estimation was employed, which is performed in an iterative manner. The logic of the regression
is whether the classification of cases into one or the other of the categories (i.e. one and zero in
the present case), of the dependent variable can be predicted by independent variable instead of
predicting arbitrary value for dependent variable through OLS (Menard, 2001).
The model registered significant Wald Score on variables such as MR1, LSIZE and
RANK as is evident from Panel A. The model fit is good because Hosmer and Lemeshow Test is
insignificant as can be seen from Panel C of Table 6. The -2LL from Panel B is low again
indicating a good fit for the model. This can be interpreted as, the most distinguishing factors
that separate venture backed IPOs from non-venture backed IPOs are the returns after listing, the
size of the issue, and the rank of lead manager. Since venture capital companies are perceived as
high quality by the lead managers they make efforts to manage the issue and therefore venture
backed IPOs get a good response and better valuation as an offer price closer to the first day
trading price. The venture backed IPOs, because of their superiority deliver expected results after
listing.
V.

Conclusions and Further Research
Indian research on initial public offerings is sparse. Previous studies have highlighted the
presence of significant underpricing in IPOs. Studies also review the aftermarket performance of
these IPOs but the aspect of venture backed IPOs and certification was never studied before. The
present study has attempted to study whether venture backed IPOs are different in terms of
underpricing and does it indicate certification of quality by venture capitalists. The study finds
that underpricing is significantly less in venture backed IPOs and through econometric models it
finds that the presence of venture capitalists on the board does signal quality of the IPO and
therefore certify the IPO.
The other aspect that was intended for this study was if venture capitalists could certify
the, IPO what distinguishes venture backed IPOs from non-venture backed IPOs. For this
purpose a logistic regression model was employed and the study finds that the determinants of
certification are aftermarket returns, size of the issue and lead manager role. That means venture
backed IPOs were managed by good lead managers and venture capitalists should always try and
employ good lead mangers because good lead manager understand the importance of a venture
capitalist and therefore they can market it better.
The present study would dispel general attitude towards an IPO of a venture capitalists
that they tend to perceive it as very risky and is fraught with dangers of failure. Good lead
managers generally understand the kind of value addition venture capitalists try to make to a firm
they fund and they therefore attempt market the firm at a better price thus reducing underpricing.
Further research should concentrate on the long term performance of venture backed
IPOs. The issue of percentage of ownership that venture capitalists would like to retain after the
IPO could also be investigated as a potential signal. It would be interesting to evaluate whether

3

BLUE stands for best linear unbiased estimation.
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there is any conflict of interest between the underwriter and the venture capitalist, if so how such
issues have to be addressed.
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Table I
Venture Capital Commitments

(Rs./million)
Amount Invested
No of Companies
Amount
Committed

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999*

2000*

3173.81

4258.04

5724.55

6728.5

10000.4

12559.8

34905

72380

428

488

602

622

691

728

4918.92

6119.25

8281.00

14019.0

25595.1

29884.0

Source: Complied from IVCA annual publications
*Figures from AVCJ 2001 edition.

Table II
Stage Wise Investment

Rs. Million
Seed
Startup
Early
Later
Turnaround

1993
822.49
1248.22
236.19
838.45
28.46

2000*
6514.2
28952
36913.8
-

2001**
1200
1843.2
14126.4
1281.6
-

Source: Compiled from IVCA annual publications
*Figures from AVCJ 2001 edition.
** Figures from IVCA Year Book 2001, converted from dollars to Rs.

79452

1213
135053
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Table III
Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Panel A
VC Initial Returns
VC Return after month1
VC Return after month 2
VC Return after month 3
Panel B
Non VC Initial Return
Non-VC monthReturn1
Non-VC month Return 2
Non-VC month Return 3
Panel C
ALL Sample Initial
Return
ALL Sample month R1
ALL Sampler month R2
ALL Sample month R3
Panel D
Initial Return to NonPremium Issues
Non-P month R1
Non-P month R2
Non-P monthR3
Premium Initial R
P month R1
P month R2
P month R3

N

Minimum

Maximum

Mean
(%)

Std. Deviation

40
40
39
39

-85.71
-62.35
-37.50
-1.00

550.00
126.13
42.50
6.76

63.1474
16.0437
-.3346
.3102

107.77881
44.20501
16.27757
1.52643

62
62
62
62

-97.50
-100.00
-37.50
-1.00

3280.50
190.00
36.10
6.76

157.6489
-16.2932
.3266
.1839

580.61313
57.77012
13.21345
1.46045

10
2
10
2
10
1
10
1

-97.50

3280.50

120.5895

458.51652

-100.00

190.00

-3.6121

54.97201

-37.50

42.50

.0713

14.39765

-1.00

6.76

.2326

1.47996

47

-30.00

3280.50

203.5780

660.24244

47
46
46
55
55
55
55

-100.00
-37.50
-1.00
-97.50
-100.00
-37.50
-1.00

126.13
36.10
6.76
550.00
190.00
42.50
3.89

-12.1977
2.3761
.2347
49.6721
3.7248
-3.8309
-.0023

51.56471
12.02102
1.67279
103.75801
57.16750
15.42629
.84109
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Table IV
Regression on Initial day returns and annualized returns

Variables ( Apriori Sign)
Dependent Variable
(Constant)
VENT (-ve)
TIMES (+ve)
PREMIUM (-ve)
RANK (-ve)
TECH (+ve)
LDELAY (+ve)
LSIZE (-ve)
MARKET (+ve)
2

2

R (Adjusted R )
F
Note: t statistic in parentheses

Coefficient Sig
Rit
-593.13
(-1.694)
99.416
(0.893)
1.555
(0.935)
-28.384
(-0.260)
-100.006
(.0906)
217.464
(2.132)
192.455
(2.737)
-139.987
(-2.422)
7.179
(3.363)
0.284
(0.218)
4.305

Coefficient Sig
ARit
.094
.375
.353
.796
.367
.036
.008
.018
.001

.000

209.036
(.440)
175.199
(1.159)
5.039
(2.230)
6.596
(.044)
-185.254
(-1.237)
225.892
(1.632)
88.441
(.927)
-228.417
(-2.911)
14.137
(4.878)
0.331
(0.270)
5.393

.661
.250
.028
.965
.219
.106
.357
.005
.000

.000

107

Table V
Regression on the returns after listing

Variables ( Apriori Sign)
Dependent Variable
(Constant)
VENT (+ve)
TIMES (-ve)
PREMIUM (-ve)
RANK (+ve)
LDELAY (-ve)
LSIZE (+ve)
MARKET (+ve)
2

2

R (Adjusted R )
F
Note: t statistic in parentheses

Coefficient Sig
MR1
49.945
(1.116)
31.584
(2.1012)
0.243
(1.139)
-17.488
(-1.267)
-2.488
(.154)
-16.257
(-1.788)
5.313
(-.723)
.609
(.838)
0.181
(0.112)
2.646

.268
.047
.258
.209
.878
.077
.472
.404

.016
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Table VI
Logistic Regression; Dependent Variable VENT
Panel A
MR1
MR2
MR3
LSIZE
TECH
RANK
Constan
t

B
.015
-.014
.006
.132
.329
1.921
-2.358

Panel B
-2 Log likelihood
88.782
Panel C

S.E.
.005
.024
.251
.047
.576
.653
.560

Wald
7.359
.365
.000
7.888
.326
8.649
17.708

df
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Sig.
.007
.546
.982
.005
.568
.003
.000

Model Summary
Cox & Snell R
Nagelkerke R
Square
Square
.356
.485
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
Chidf
Sig.
square
4.534
8
.806

Exp(B)
1.015
.986
1.006
1.141
1.390
6.825
.095

